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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The instant action comes within the original jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court of Utah under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j), as 
amended, and Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Is the Board of Education of Davis County School District 
entitled to immunity for plaintiff's negligence claims in which 
the alleged injury arose out of an alleged intentional assault 
and battery? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This matter was before the trial court 
on a motion to dismiss. Because this issue raises only questions 
of law, the Court should give the trial court's ruling no 
deference and review it under a correctness standard. City of 
Logan v. Utah Power & Light Co.. 796 P.2d 697 (Utah 1990). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (1989): 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this 
chapter, all governmental entities are immune 
from suit for any injury which results from 
the exercise of a governmental function, 
governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, 
or other governmental health care facility, 
and from an approved medical, nursing, or 
other professional health care clinical 
training program conducted in either public 
or private facilities. 
The management of flood waters and other 
natural disasters and the construction, 
repair, and operation of flood and storm 
systems by governmental entities are 
considered to be governmental functions, and 
governmental entities and their officers and 
employees are immune from suit for any injury 
or damage resulting from those activities. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (1990): 
Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or omission of an 
employee committed within the scope of 
employment except if the injury arises out 
of: 
(1) the exercise or performance or the 
failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function, whether or not the 
discretion is abused; 
(2) assault, battery, false imprisonment, 
false arrest, malicious prosecution, 
intentional trespass, abuse of process, 
libel, slander, deceit, interference with 
contract rights, infliction of mental 
anguish, or civil rights; 
(3) the issuance, denial, suspension, or 
revocation of or by the failure or refusal to 
issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit, 
license, certificate, approval, order, or 
similar authorization; 
(4) a failure to make an inspection or by 
making an inadequate or negligent inspection 
of any property; 
(5) the institution or prosecution of any 
judicial or administrative proceeding, even 
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if malicious or without probable cause; 
(6) a misrepresentation by the employee 
whether or not it is negligent or 
intentional; 
(7) or results from riots, unlawful 
assemblies, public demonstrations, mob 
violence, and civil disturbances; 
(8) or in connection with the collection of 
and assessment of taxes; 
(9) the activities of the Utah National 
Guard; 
(10) the incarceration of any person in any 
state prison, county or city jail, or other 
place of legal confinement; 
(11) any natural condition on state lands or 
as the result of any activity authorized by 
the Board of State Lands and Forestry; 
(12) research or implementation of cloud 
management or seeding for the clearing of 
fog; or 
(13) the activities of: 
(a) providing emergency medical assistance; 
(b) fighting fire; 
(c) regulating, mitigating, or handling 
hazardous materials or hazardous wastes; 
(d) emergency evacuations; or 
(e) intervening during dam emergencies. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Nature of the Case 
Plaintiff, Donald Petersen, brought this action against 
Alema Teo and the defendant-appellant Board of Education. 
Plaintiff alleged that he was assaulted and battered by Alema 
Teo, an employee of the Board of Education. Plaintiff further 
alleged that the appellant Board of Education was negligent; in 
hiring and retaining Alema Teo, in its employees failing to 
prevent or intervene in the assault and battery committed by 
their co-worker, and, in failing to provide adequate security. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Defendant Board of Education moved to dismiss this action as 
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to itself on the basis of governmental immunity. The trial court 
denied this motion in its decision of February 26, 1992. 
Defendant Board of Education petitioned this Court for permission 
to file the instant interlocutory appeal on March 17, 1992. By 
Order dated April 13, 1992, this Court granted the Board of 
Education an interlocutory appeal. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Because this action is before the Court on the trial court's 
denial of Defendant Board of Education's motion to dismiss, the 
following factual allegations are those contained in the 
plaintiff's complaint. 
1. Defendant Alema Teo is an employee of the Defendant 
Board of Education of Davis County School District. (R. 3, para. 
7). 
2. Shortly before the end of a basketball game between 
Woods Cross and Bountiful High Schools, a spectator (Scott 
Rodrick) and Alema Teo (the announcer for the game) had an 
altercation. (R. 3-4, para. 13-16). 
3. Rodrick made several comments to Teo, and Teo either 
shoved or struck Rodrick. (R. 3-4). 
4. Plaintiff alleges that Teo "touched the person of the 
plaintiff in a harmful, unwelcome and/or offensive manner and/or 
put plaintiff in apprehension that he would be so touched, to 
wit: Teo grabbed plaintiff's arm and yanked him from where he 
stood in the stands to the floor of the basketball court." (R. 
4, para. 18). 
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5. Petersen further alleges that Teo then struck the 
plaintiff, on the left side of Petersen's head, knocking Mr. 
Petersen unconscious. (R. 4, para. 19). 
6. Mr. Petersen has not alleged any injuries other than 
those suffered as a result of the assault and battery he claims 
to have suffered at the hands of Alema Teo. 
7. Plaintiff Donald Petersen's complaint contains three 
causes of action against the Board of Education. First, Petersen 
alleges that the Board was negligent in hiring and retaining an 
employee who would commit assault and battery. (R. 5-6, para. 
25-28). 
8. Second, Petersen alleges that the Board was negligent in 
the failure of its employees (identified as John Does I-V) to 
intervene and protect the plaintiff from the assault and battery 
committed by Teo, a fellow employee of the Board of Education. 
(R. 6-7, para. 32-33) . 
9. Petersen's third cause of action against the Board 
alleges that the Board was negligent in not providing adequate 
security to prevent the alleged assault and battery. (R. 7, 
para. 37-38). 
10. Petersen's final cause of action alleges assault and 
battery against Defendant Alema Teo. (R. 8, para. 42). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff claims that he was assaulted and battered by Alema 
Teo, an employee of the Board of Education. While plaintiff 
alleges three causes of action against the Board of Education for 
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various kinds of negligence, all of the claimed injury arises out 
of the alleged assault and battery. 
Plaintiff admits that the challenged actions of the Board of 
Education are a governmental function. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-
10(2) (1990) expressly retains the immunity of governmental 
entities for negligence where the injury arises out of assault 
and battery. The crucial question is from what act the injury 
arises, and not what type of negligence is alleged to have led to 
the injury causing action. 
Given this clear retention of immunity for injuries arising 
out of assault and battery, the trial court erred when it denied 
the Board of Education's motion to dismiss. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT BOARD OF EDUCATION HAS NOT 
WAIVED ITS IMMUNITY FOR INJURIES ARISING OUT 
OF ASSAULT AND BATTERY 
This Court has applied a three step approach to determining 
whether or not immunity is applicable to a specific case. The 
first step is to determine whether the activity performed by the 
entity is a governmental function. The Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act grants immunity to governmental entities in their 
exercise of governmental functions. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 
(1989)• In the instant action, plaintiff has conceded that the 
claims against the Board of Education arise from what is "clearly 
a governmental function." (R. 44). 
The second step requires a determination of whether there is 
a waiver of immunity. If such a waiver exists, the third step 
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involves a determination regarding any exceptions to the waiver. 
The Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1, et 
seq., does not contain a waiver of immunity for intentional torts 
(such as assault and battery) of government employees. Alema Teo 
has been named as a party to this action and recovery can be had 
from him if he is found to have performed the intentional torts 
of assault and battery. 
The only waiver that might apply in the instant action is 
the waiver of immunity for the negligent acts or omissions of an 
employee found in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30 lr '1990). 
But this waiver of immunity is suLjcCL to numerous 
exceptions. One of those exceptions retains the Board of 
Education's immunity "if the injury arises out of: assault, 
battery." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2) (1990). 
That exception was before this Court in Maddocks v. Salt 
Lake Citv Corp.. 740 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1987). Maddocks was an 
action against Salt Lake City by a man who alleged that he had 
been wrongfully arrested by three city police officers, one of 
whom unlawfully beat the plaintiff while the others failed to 
intervene. Maddocks sought to avoid the retention of immunity 
for assault, battery, false imprisonment and false arrest that is 
contained in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2) (1990), by couching his 
claim as one of negligence for the failure of the fellow officers 
to intervene to prevent the assault and battery. 
In affirming the trial court's conclusion that the 
negligence claim was barred by the Governmental Immunity Act, 
7 
this Court explained: 
Plaintiff's phrasing of the claim against 
Salt Lake City as one for negligence does not 
bring it within the category of claims for 
which immunity is waived. Utah Code Ann. § 
63-30-10 (1986) waives governmental immunity 
wfor injury proximately caused by a negligent 
act or omission of an employee committed 
within the scope of employment." Immunity 
is, however, restored for negligent acts 
arising out of "assault, battery, false 
imprisonment [or] false arrest." Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-10(1) (b) (1986). We think that 
Plaintiff's negligence claim arises out of 
battery and false imprisonment and is 
therefore not the sort of claim for which 
immunity has been waived. 
Id. at 1340. The instant action cannot be distinguished from 
Maddocks. In the instant action, Petersen's second cause of 
action against the Board of Education is the very same claim that 
the government entity was negligent because its employees failed 
to intervene and prevent the assault and battery allegedly 
committed by their co-worker. 
Petersen's claim of negligent hiring and retention, and his 
claim alleging failure to provide adequate security, both fail 
for the same reason. All of the injuries claimed by Petersen 
arise out of the alleged assault and battery. For this reason 
the Board of Education's immunity has not been waived regardless 
of the particular negligence plaintiff might allege. 
Connell v. Tooele Citv. 572 P.2d 697 (Utah 1977), involved a 
clerk who negligently failed to recall an erroneous bench 
warrant. Because of this error, Connell was wrongly arrested and 
imprisoned. This Court held that the city was entitled to 
immunity because the very "gist and essence" of the action was 
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the false arrest and imprisonment. 
Although plaintiff's complaint alleges 
negligence of the clerk in keeping her books, 
we are of the opinion that all of the 
injuries claimed by plaintiff arise out of 
one of the excepted torts set forth in 
Section 63-30-10(2) . 
Id. at 698-699. The Board of Education is entitled to 
governmental immunity for any alleged negligence of its employees 
where the injury arises out of assault and battery. 
The particular act of negligence that a plaintiff may allege 
is not determinative of whether or not governmental immunity 
applies. The salient question is out of what act the complained 
of injuries arose. 
In Gillman v. Dept. of Financial Institutions, 782 P.2d 506 
(Utah 1989)# a bankruptcy trustee brought suit against the State 
based upon various types of negligence on the part of state 
employees. This Court looked beyond the particular types of 
negligence that were alleged and found that the State was 
entitled to immunity because the claims asserted were all for 
injuries arising out of licensing decisions for which immunity 
was retained by § 63-30-10(3). 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(10) (1990) provides a similar 
exception to immunity for negligence when the injury arises out 
of "the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county 
or city jail, or other place of legal confinement." Madsen v. 
State. 583 P.2d 92 (Utah 1978), was a wrongful death action 
against the State of Utah from the heirs of an inmate who died 
following surgery. This Court, holding that the State of Utah 
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was immune under § 63-30-10, explained that the plain meaning of 
the phrase arising out of incarceration was to retain immunity 
for any injuries occurring while the incarcerated person was in 
prison and under the control of the state. 
In Eotincr v. State. 546 P.2d 242 (Utah 1976) the State of 
Utah was held to be immune from suit when a work release inmate 
murdered the plaintiff's mother. More recently, in Kirk v. 
State, 784 P.2d 1255, 1257 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), the Court of 
Appeals held that the arising out of incarceration exception 
barred a bailiff's negligence action against the State for 
injuries inflicted by a prison inmate attempting to escape. 
There is no reason to read the retention of immunity for 
injuries arising out of assault and battery any narrower than the 
courts of Utah have read the immunity for injuries arising out of 
false arrest, false imprisonment, licensing or incarceration. 
That the trial court did just that was erroneous. 
Plaintiff's claimed injuries all arose out of the alleged 
assault and battery committed by Alema Teo. For this reason, the 
Board of Education is entitled to governmental immunity and the 
trial court erred in not granting the Board's motion to dismiss. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in denying the Board of Education of 
Davis County School District's motion to dismiss. The Board is 
entitled to governmental immunity because the challenged injury 
arises out of assault and battery, for which immunity has been 
retained. For these reasons Defendant-Appellant Board of 
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Education asks this Court to reverse the trial court and order 
this action dismissed with prejudice as it relates to this 
Defendant. 
Respectfully submitted this / day of June, 1992• 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Utah Attorney General 
BRENT A. BURNETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Board of Education 
of Davis County School District 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DONALD PETERSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
ALEMA TEO, an individual, 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF DAVIS 
COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, a body 
corporate, and JOHN DOES I-V, 
individuals, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER DENYING 
DEFENDANT BOARD OF EDUCATION 
OF DAVIS COUNTY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER 
JURISDICTION 
Civil No. 910750444 
Judge Rodney S. Page 
The Court having reviewed Defendant Board of Education of 
Davis County School District's (Hereinafter "D.C.S.D.") Motion to 
Dismiss For Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and the Memoranda 
submitted in support of and in opposition to that Motion, the Court 
having rendered its decision, now makes the following Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On or about February 14, 1991, Plaintiff was at 
Woods Cross Senior High School in order to observe a sporting event 
e: \*»S\PIZAB XNOVrtTXMtN. PP2 
between teams from Woods Cross Senior High School and Bountiful 
Senior High School. 
2. Plaintiff's Complaint at paragraphs 18 and 19 
alleges that Defendant Teo, an employee of D.C.S.D. who had been 
announcing the basketball game, touched the person of Plaintiff in 
a harmful, unwelcome and/or offensive manner and/or put Plaintiff 
in apprehension that he would be so touched, to wit: Teo grabbed 
Plaintiff's arm and yanked him from where he stood in the stands to 
the floor of the basketball court, and Teo struck Plaintiff on and 
about the left side of his face and head, knocked him unconscious, 
and caused him to fall to the floor and strike his head. 
3. The First Cause of Action of Plaintiff's Complaint 
alleges D.C.S.D. negligently hired and retained Teo and breached 
its duty to hire and retain qualified employees pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. $ 53A-6-105 (1953 as amended), and that this breach was 
a direct and proximate cause of the claimed injuries. 
4. The Second Cause of Action of Plaintiff's Complaint 
alleges D.C.S.D. breached its duty to Plaintiff by negligently 
failing to intervene and protect Plaintiff from Teo's violent acts, 
and that this breach was a direct and proximate cause of the 
claimed injuries. 
5. The Third Cause of Action of Plaintiff's Complaint 
alleges D.C.S.D. breached its duty to Plaintiff to provide adequate 
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security for Plaintiff, a spectator, and that this breach was a 
direct and proximate cause of the claimed Injuries. 
6. The Fourth Cause of Action of Plaintiff's Complaint 
alleges a cause of action for assault and battery against Defendant 
Teo. 
7. The Fifth Cause of Action of Plaintiff's Complaint 
alleges that Defendant Teo was negligent, grossly negligent, 
malicious, and recklessly disregarded Plaintifffs health and 
safety. 
8. Defendant D.C.S.D.'s Motion to Dismiss was based 
upon its immunity from suit pursuant to the Governmental Immunity 
Act, Utah Code Ann. S 63-30-1 et seq., particularly S 63-30-
10(l)(b), (1953 as amended). 
9. Plaintiff failed to file an Undertaking as required 
by Utah Code Ann. S 63-30-19 (1953 as amended). 
10. Defendant D.C.S.D.'s Motion to Dismiss was also 
based upon Plaintiff's failure to file an Undertaking pursuant to 
the above-referenced statute. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court enters the 
following Conclusions of Law: 
1. The First, Second and Third Causes of Action of the 
Complaint regarding D.C.S.D.'s negligent hiring and retention of 
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Teo, negligent failure to intervene, and negligent failure to 
provide adequate security, are not barred by the Governmental 
Immunity Act pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 63-30-1 et seq.. 
particularly S 63-30-10(1)(b) (1953 as amended). 
2. Plaintiff's failure to file an Undertaking as 
required by Utah Code Ann. S 63-30-19 will not bar Plaintiff's 
suit; however, if Plaintiff desires to proceed with this lawsuit he 
must file a $300.00 undertaking as required by statute within 
fifteen days of the date hereof. 
ORDER 
From the foregoing Findings and Conclusions of Law, the 
Court hereby enters the following Order: 
Defendant, Board of Education of Davis County School 
District's Motion To Dismiss For Lack of Subject Matter 
Jurisdiction is hereby denied. 
DATED this 2 V**- day of February, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
Y: Judge Rodney S. Pi B Page 
FORM AND CONTENT 
J/^MARK WARD 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
ATTORNEYS FOR D.C.S.D. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the day of February, 
1992, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order was deposited in the United States 
mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following: 
J. Mark Ward, Esq. 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Attorney for Defendant Board of Education 
of Davis County School District 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Steven B. Smith, Esq. 
SCALLEY & READING 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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